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INTRODUCTION
In 1935, Mrs. George E. Frazer of Winnetka, Illinois, daughter of
the late President Edmund Janes James of the University of Illinois,
generously gave the University a sum of money, which was substan-
tially increased in 1938, for the establishment of a permanent annual
lectureship in the field of government as a memorial to her father.
Under the terms of the gift the lecturers are chosen and the lectureship
administered by a committee of the faculty constituted from among
the professors of political science and economics. The three lectures
that have so far been delivered on this foundation are now issued by
the University in published form, and others that are to follow in the
future will likewise be published from time to time. It is believed that
these lectures, dealing as they do with subjects falling within the field
in which President James's own special interests lay as a scholar and
teacher, constitute a very fitting memorial to him, and it is the hope of
the University of Illinois in publishing them that they may prove help-
ful and stimulating to many citizens of Illinois, and of other states,
who are interested in the problems of government and public affairs.
James W. Garner
{ 7 )

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE OF PRESIDENT JAMES 1
By Evarts B. Greene
Professor of History, Columbia University
Edmund Janes James (May 21, 1855-June 17, 1925), economist and
university president, born at Jacksonville, 111., was the son of Colin
Dew James and his wife, Amanda Keziah Casad. His father, a Vir-
ginian by birth, was a presiding elder in the Blinois Methodist Confer-
ence. After graduating from the high school of the Blinois State
Normal University (1873), Edmund James spent a scant year at
Northwestern University, and another (1874-1875) at Harvard. The
following autumn he entered the University of Halle, where he studied
economics with Conrad and took his doctorate (1877) with a disserta-
tion on the American tariff. In the Halle University circle James also
met Anna Margarethe Lange whom he married on August 22, 1879.
Three of their six children survived nim.
Returning to Illinois, full of enthusiasm for German scholarship,
he taught first in the Evanston High School and later as principal of
his old school at Normal (1879-1882). He was an inspiring teacher
and several of his pupils had successful academic careers. He also
published educational essays and in 1881 founded, with Charles De
Garmo, the Illinois School Journal. Meantime, his contributions to
J. J. Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Political Science (1881-1883) on such
topics as "Factory Laws" and "Finance," brought him recognition as
a promising young economist, and in 1883 he became professor of
Public Finance and Administration in the new Wharton School of
Finance and Economy at the University of Pennsylvania. He impressed
his early Pennsylvania students by his "clear, vigorous, and realistic"
teaching, stimulating interest in higher studies and productive scholar-
ship. The recognized leader of the Wharton School faculty, he was
also active in promoting commercial education elsewhere. Visiting
Europe under the auspices of the American Bankers Association, he
published his Education of Business Men in Europe (1893), which
attracted much attention. He was one of the younger economists who
were active in organizing the American Economic Association, and one
of its first two vice-presidents (1885). The dissatisfaction of these
younger scholars with "classical" economics is reflected in his preface
to J. K. Ingram's A History of Political Economy (1888). His center
'This is a revision of a biographical sketch originally published in the
Dictionary of American Biography. Acknowledgments are hereby made to the
publishers, Messrs. Charles Scribners' Sons for their kind permission to reprint
here the sketch in its present form.
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of interest was shifting, however, from economics to politics with a
special interest in municipal problems, and he was the first president
of the Municipal League of Philadelphia (1891). More significant
was his founding of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science (1889-1890) ; he was also its first president (1890-1901) and
the first editor of its Annals (1890-1896).
In these varied activities, some friction developed and in 1896 James
went to the University of Chicago as professor of public administra-
tion and director of university extension—he had been president of
the American Association for the Extension of University Teaching.
His career at Chicago was short (1896-1901) but he established con-
tacts which proved useful as he turned from intensive scholarship to
educational administration. After two years as president of North-
western University (1902-1904) he was elected to the presidency of
the University of Illinois, where he spent fifteen years in active ser-
vice (1904-1919). He was exceptionally equipped for his new post.
A native of the state, he knew its public school system at first-hand as
pupil and teacher, while his knowledge of educational developments at
home and abroad gave him an unusual perspective. Above all, he
believed in the ability and willingness of a democracy, properly in-
formed and led, to build up a real university. His first appeal to the
legislature brought the biennial appropriation to nearly a million and a
half, and during the next decade this amount was increased to about
five millions. Meantime, though admission requirements were ad-
vanced, student attendance increased more than eighty per cent ; the
faculty was rapidly expanded ; and several major buildings were added.
More significant was the enlargement of research equipment and the
setting of higher standards. To a remarkable extent, the more capable
younger workers—whether in humanistic, scientific, or professional
studies—were made to feel that their special problems were under-
stood and their opinions on larger issues worth considering. It would
not be fair to close even this brief summary of a notable administra-
tion without acknowledging the contribution made by Mrs. James
through her special gift of simple friendliness and unpretentious
hospitality.
Constantly involved in large projects, James's treatment of aca-
demic routine was sometimes open to criticism and during the later
years of his administration his personal associations abroad made the
World War a difficult ordeal for himself and his family, though his
wife's death in 1914 spared her the realization of what was to follow.
James hoped that American participation might be avoided ; but,
though cosmopolitan in his interests, he was politically a strong
nationalist, and when the United States entered the war, he was eager
to help, both personally and through the expert services of the Univer-
sity. Never robust, however, he broke down under the stress of this
{ 10}
trying period. After a year's leave of absence he resigned the presi-
dency in 1920. He died five years later at Covina, California. His
keen sense of the dramatic may have verged at times on the theatrical
;
but he was essentially large-minded, dealing realistically with situations
and with men while taking a human interest in individuals. Though
reserved in his expression of religious feeling, he retained his Metho-
dist connections and took a catholic interest in religious education.
I 11 1
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THE AMERICAN STATE UNIVERSITY:
A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE AMERICAN STATE UNIVERSITY:
A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1
By Herman G. James
President of Ohio University
The literature on the American State University is, as might be ex-
pected, already extensive and varied and growing apace. National and
state agencies have made it the subject of investigation and study,
books and articles on American public education give minor, major, or
entire attention to the state university, and scarcely a year goes by
without the inauguration of a state university president. Still more
rarely does such an inauguration go by without one or more addresses
on the subject.
But this vast and growing literature is naturally concerned pri-
marily with what the state university has done, can do, or should do
as its contribution to the life of the state. The constitutional, legal,
and governmental aspects have largely been either ignored, or viewed
simply in the light of their supposed connection with the avowed
objectives postulated in the discussion.
Obviously, if the purpose of a state university, of all state univer-
sities let us say, were crystal clear, immutable, and universally ac-
cepted, there would be little interest in a consideration of the constitu-
tional, legal, and governmental aspects of the problem, except so far
as they would have a bearing on the attainment of that shining
objective. Anything that seemed to delay or impede such attainment
would then automatically become bad, and anything that seemed to
further the avowed program would be good. There would still, of
course, be vast room for differences of opinion as to whether a particu-
lar factor would be helpful or harmful in the attainment of the ultimate
goal ; and there would also be the possibility that the unanimous
opinion of those interested in the advance of the state university as an
instrument of progress would prove to be mistaken as to what would
finally speed or delay the consummation so devoutly to be desired.
Rut general considerations of political science or theory as applied to
the phenomenon of the state university would in such event easily be
ignored or brushed aside, along perhaps with some considerations of
greater importance relating to the political arts.
But, unfortunately, there is no universal agreement even as to the
underlying philosophy of the state university, much less as to practical
'Delivered April 6, 1936.
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means whereby any such philosophy might be realized in practice.
And so some of the basic considerations which on the surface seem
most obviously incontrovertible, prove, upon closer examination, to be
predicated on a hypothesis which is deserving of greater scrutiny
than is ordinarily accorded it.
For example: One of the slogans receiving the unanimous support
of the Society of the Friends of State Universities would certainly be,
"Keep Politics out of our State Universities." Sometimes you even
encounter the naive assertion by state university presidents, trustees,
faculty members, alumni, or students that their particular institution
has been kept free from politics.
What does that mean? Until you know what is meant, it doesn't
mean a thing. And sometimes even after you know what is meant, it
still doesn't mean a thing. If all that is meant by that statement is that
avowed politicians, that is, office holders, or prospective office holders,
or influential members of recognized political groups or organized
parties have not been successful in putting their friends or relatives
on the university payroll, or in getting degrees in course, or honoris
causa, for their proteges, or in influencing directly the kinds of doc-
trines taught or the manner of their presentation, then only the grosser
and more patent aspects of political manipulation are involved. And
to the extent that some state universities have succeeded in being free
of these manifestations, they are, of course, far ahead of those institu-
tions that have not escaped. But these obvious instances of the less
subtle interference with the conduct of state universities by no means
exhaust the list of possibilities.
If we include in the concept of "politics" the means whereby the
policies of an institution are affected by the convictions, desires, or
ambitions of an individual or group, within or without the university,
which convictions, desires, or ambitions, are not demonstrably con-
nected with the objectives of the institution as such, then no state
institution is free from "politics." A most enlightening investigation of
the part played by politics of this nature in the history of our state
institutions could be made with great profit, if only the facts could be
made available. They relate to the convictions entertained by indi-
viduals, or groups in more or less strategic positions, as to economic
or social theories, rules of individual conduct, or curriculum offerings
within the institution.
One of the most obvious and best known of these phenomena is,
perhaps, the football situation. Stripped of all sham and obfuscating
verbiage, one potent reason for continuing the program of American
intercollegiate football, in spite of all its abuses and the wide-spread
criticism directed towards it, is that a very vocal and supposedly potent
body of alumni insist upon having it. And that same body, of course,
are those who insist that the quality of the football offered shall be
{ 16 J
high, and who also claim the right to decide when and how football
coaches shall be changed.
It is only tair to say that the influence of this kind of "politics" is
as potent in private institutions as in public, in fact, in many cases
more so. It includes such phenomena as having certain religious sects
or groups of sects decide what subjects shall or shall not be taught in
the universities, and using every means within their power to impose
their will on these institutions. In respect to such issues, and also with
respect to economic and social issues directly exciting their trustees or
their benefactors, the private institutions are, of course, even more
vulnerable than are the state universities.
But let us turn from these narrow concepts of "politics" as influenc-
ing state universities, which are universal and ineradicable, though
capable of being kept within more or less reasonable bounds by the
exercise of eternal vigilance and unfaltering courage, to the opposite
extreme. In the broadest sense, in a democracy, "politics" means the
influence of public opinion. It would seem axiomatic that an institution
which derives its being and its financial support from the body politic,
which is the state, cannot escape from the ultimate sanction of public
opinion. Indeed, it is to my mind axiomatic that it should not, for that
would be a denial of the very democratic ideal on which the whole
state university idea is founded.
To the extent that state universities are affected by enrollment,
either because numbers impress the legislature or because the income
from student fees is increasingly important in the university budget
(and both considerations seem more than ever potent), when there is
the further element of having to attract students, which makes the
rather limited clientele of prospective students and their parents a
factor in the picture, an additional element of public opinion is in-
volved. But whether this be included or excluded, it is obvious that,
in the long run, no state university is going to prosper in the best
sense of the word which cannot convince the electorate on which it,
in the last analysis, depends for the most of its financial support that
the university is a worth-while recipient of tax moneys.
It is this fundamental, and, it would seem, self-evident truth which
is so frequently overlooked at the very outset of the approach to the
problem. All devices, plans, proposals, wishes, and hopes involving the
elimination of politics in this basic sense of prevailing public opinion
are inevitably destined to be illusory, even though it could be proven
that there is a unified body of expert or professional opinion concern-
ing the purpose and scope of state universities which is distinguishable
from and superior to lay, or taxpayer, or voter, or citizen opinion as
to these fundamentals.
One reason for this curious ignoring or side stepping of the most
fundamental issue of all in state universities, is no doubt the fact that
{ 17}
the period of real growth, expansion, and manifest destiny of the
American state university coincided with the half century from about
1875 t0 I 92 5- which marked the golden age of national growth, expan-
sion, and manifest destiny. The astonishing multiplication, expansion,
and development of the state university as a phenomenon of American
life during this period was no doubt, in large part, due to the fact that
there were intelligent active leaders in the movement, and that in a gen-
eral way the underlying philosophy was demonstrably bound up with
wide-spread allegiance to democracy as exemplified by equality of edu-
cational opportunity in the higher levels: a projection, of course, of
the forces that made possible in this same period the almost incredible
expansion of opportunities for public high school education.
But while according all honor and recognition to these two con-
siderations as factors in the rise of the state university, we must rec-
ognize also that in a popular sense the state universities were not
costing the people anything. That is, the great mass of the people
were totally unaware of any financial burden imposed upon them from
this source, partly because the amount spent for the state university
was only a very minor part of the sums spent by the state as a whole,
and in turn the amount of tax money spent by the state as a whole was
relatively insignificant compared to the tax money spent by the sub-
divisions, townships, school districts, other special districts, towns,
cities, and counties, and partly because the general property tax basis
did not directly reach a great many people, especiallv in the cities.
It is significant in this connection to point out that during the era
of rapidly mounting appropriations for state universities, as a group
and as individual institutions, the almost universal complaint was
heard that the chief impediment to even faster and more astonishing
expansion were the farmers, the very people, one would suppose, who
by reason of democratic traditions and relatively inferior opportunities
would be behind the new institutions to a man. These farmers were
quite generally reviled by those immediately concerned with the for-
tunes of state universities as being willing to spend two thousand dol-
lars for a prize bull but balking at two thousand dollars salary for a
professor of philosophy or rhetoric.
The answer, of course, was that the farmer was, before the more
recent spread of. tenantry, typically the broad basis for the direct real
property tax burden, and while even his contribution to the state uni-
versity was but a very small part of his tax burden, it was a real and
readily discernible one. The city dweller on the other hand was pro-
portionately to a much smaller extent numerically a direct taxpayer,
and even when he was such a taxpayer, the share of his tax contri-
bution that went to the state university was incomparably less.
When the present economic depression struck us (and to a lesser
extent when prior depressions, local or national, whether affecting
{ 18 ]
directly only a partial group like the agricultural depressions, or the
industrial depressions, or all groups alike) the state universities were
the first to suffer in appropriations among state activities and in many
instances were the chief sufferers. Astonishment and chagrin at this
development, especially since the desire and demand for public higher
education seemed to be increasing, could only be explained on the basis
of a failure to understand that the golden age of the state universities
was fundamentally but a pale reflection of the golden age of economic
America as a whole.
The increasing demands that people who wanted their children to
have higher education should pay for it themselves, coupled with
diminished appropriations from legislatures, led in some cases to in-
creasing tuition and other charges (which had, indeed steadily though
almost imperceptibly, mounted during the good times as a painless and
unobjectionable way of still further increasing the revenues of state
universities) at a time when students could least afford additional
charges.
At this point it may be proper to interject an observation concern-
ing a matter that will be referred to again in another connection,
namely, the FERA or NYA as it is now called. There are many
questionable features of the NYA, educationally, socially, and politi-
cally, some of which will have to be considered in this discussion. But
it must be said here that the NYA, and its predecessor FERA, by
providing tuition money for some ten or twelve per cent of the students
in attendance at state universities in the years since 1933, saved many a
state university from a much more serious slump than would have been
experienced in these depression years without that aid.
We must, therefore, recognize that a very pronounced thread, not
to say color band, that runs through the entire fabric of the picture of
the state university as a social and political phenomenon, is the neces-
sity of convincing the people who pay the bills that the piper is worth
paying. In other words, at bottom the state university is and must be
political, and it makes no difference from this point of view, except
for a relatively brief span of years, whether the income derived from
the public by the universities is guaranteed by the constitution, in-
vested in so-called "irreducible funds," ladled out biennially by the
legislature, or even in extreme cases, determined by the initiative and
referendum. If total resources are limited, and they are and always
have been, though that realization has just begun to strike home, the
share of those resources available for public higher education will, in
the last analysis, be determined by the conviction of the body politic as
to the relative values to be derived from the expenditure of funds in
this manner rather than in some other.
With this basic consideration in mind, it becomes unnecessary here
to enter into a discussion as to what is a state university from a legal
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point of view. Many interesting cases have come before our state
courts, and even before the federal courts, involving a definition of
a state university. Some of these have been collected in special treatises
and they make interesting reading, fascinating for students of law, and
indispensable for university executives. But from the point of view
adopted in this presentation, it is sufficient to say that any university
that receives any state funds is to that extent a state university.
Even an admittedly private or sectarian institution which enjoys ex-
emption from taxation is to that very limited extent a state institu-
tion, as evidenced by the fact that within recent years there has been
a very pronounced movement in some quarters to deprive them of ex-
emption, the Dartmouth College Case to the contrary notwithstanding.
Let a private institution announce that it is going to teach the virtues
of Communism, and very shortly every means will be attempted to
take away from such institution its exemption from taxation. From
that extreme case at the bottom of the scale, to the opposite extreme
where every cent of revenue comes from public sources, and through
all the gradations in between, it remains true, that to the extent that
institutions are in receipt of public funds, to that extent are they sub-
ject to the fundamental principle that the power over the purse strings
is the most significant aspect of political power.
For the sake of narrowing the discussion within more concrete
limits let us consider the typical American state university as one
that derives all its powers from the state, substantially all its revenues
from the same source, and is under the complete control of the state.
What are the problems of government presented by this agency, and
how could they best be met? It must be emphasized at the outset that
I am viewing the problem as a political scientist primarily, and not
as a university president, although the latter point of view cannot en-
tirely be left out of consideration.
How should this state activity be fitted into the general scheme of
state government? There are various possibilities. It might be a
wholly independent constitutional division of state government, with
its own elective governing officers. It might be a separate agency set
up by legislative act. It might be an integral part of the administrative
machinery subordinated directly to the governor. Or it might be, as is
the typical situation, a confused combination of the principles under-
lying all three of the above mentioned methods of organization.
As a matter of fact, while in practice almost all of the above
possibilities are realized, with a number of variations and combinations,
the characteristic situation may be described as that of a state-wide
public corporation with its own officers or directors, either elected by
the voters or appointed by the governor, in some instances even chosen
by the legislature. In many cases, there are ex officio members of this
{ 20}
board, such as the governor, the secretary of agriculture, and the
superintendent of public instruction, etc.
From the point of view of university administration, it is generally
agreed that the important consideration is to have a governing body
that is as far removed from partisan political influences as possible.
The most promising set-up from that point of view would seem to be
a board made up of members appointed by the governor for over-
lapping terms, much longer than that of the appointing power, and
removable only by a process of impeachment through the regular
courts.
But from the point of view of principles of public administration,
the situation is not so simple. Let us grant that because of the many
questions of public policy actually and potentially involved in the state
university, most obviously because of its dependence upon public
funds in one form or another, the board form of administrative organ-
ization is indicated here rather than the commissioner form, what is
the scientific justification for a separate board for the state university?
Obviously, the American state university is the capstone of the
whole system of public education from the pre-nursery school to the
Ph.D. or post-graduate professional degrees. As such it must needs
ultimately be integrated into the entire public educational system,
and the governing board, if board there be, should be a state board of
education with control over all of the educational activities of the
state, elementary, secondary, and higher.
This, of course, is no new suggestion. It has been made again and
again, especially since the rapid growth of the public high school
movement following the Civil War. But the idea has not advanced
far along the path of realization, in spite of the fact that the logic
of the contention seems unassailable. Why not?
The explanation is in large part quite simple. For one thing, the
interests directly concerned with the advancement of the state univer-
sities, meaning fundamentally the increase in legislative appropriations,
have felt consciously or unconsciously that the chances of mustering
support in the legislature for the institution were better if directed
through a group of interests centering in a board specially charged
with the fostering of the advancement of that institution. For another
thing, the idea of one central state authority for the direction of all
public education activities of the state has involved, expressly or by
implication, the idea of an executive head for the state authority,
exemplified by the office of superintendent of public instruction, or
commissioner of education, or some similar title. And curiously enough,
in that great group of states west of the Allegheny Mountains in which
the state universities have risen to the greatest importance, the super-
intendent of public instruction or the officer corresponding to that
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post, although set apart from the general administrative organization
of the state, mainly, perhaps, for the purpose of removing him from
"politics," by making him an elective officer, has inevitably been a
politician par excellence, a school politician, if you please, but typically
a politician. The idea of entrusting the development of a university
to the capacities and interests of such an individual has seemed too
fantastic to receive very general support. For still another thing, the
superintendent of public instruction, or the state board of education,
where there was one, has until very recent times had very little to say
even about elementary education, much less about high school educa-
tion. The independent school district, one of the stereotyped props
of the sacred structure of local self-government, with its power of
local taxation and its autonomous school board, has very successfully
thumbed its nose at state education authorities. Under these circum-
stances, it was not impertinent to point out that control over the highest
educational facilities in the state, the state university, should not be
vested in an alleged state educational authority whose real power could
be exercised only over rural county schools of the one-room type.
Even there, chiefly because of the fact that the elective county super-
intendent was himself an important political power, whose support
was needed for re-election, the control was most likely to take the
form of a bid for support.
But the picture has changed very materially, especially in these last
six years, and some of these factors are no longer so potent, while
new ones have entered the scene.
So, for example, the multiplication of tax-supported institutions
of higher education in numbers and in duplication of offerings, prac-
tically unobserved and unopposed in the good old days of steadily
rising expenditures, has become in many states a serious problem of
survival for the state university. It must battle, not merely against
the other state agencies demanding a share of the state revenues in
these times of depleted treasuries, but also against other institutions
of higher education demanding a larger recognition. Normal schools,
for instance, have in many states frankly abandoned their original
field of service and become in name and in legislative eyes not merely
general liberal arts colleges, but even universities offering advanced
degrees. The sam.e has been true of other technical schools, formerly
state institutions with a definitely limited field, now all miniature state
universities, and not so miniature at that. Added to this development
is the fact that municipal institutions of higher learning, sometimes
modest junior colleges, sometimes full four-year institutions, and some-
times even complete universities, have multiplied in numbers and
demands. Even where they have not as yet made appeals for state
aid, and some of them have, the added local tax burden has made the
securing of support for a more distant state university increasingly
difficult.
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The very interesting and significant developments in a number of
states, Montana, Georgia, North Carolina, Oregon, involving the in-
tegration of all state institutions of higher education under a single
board is simply one step in the direction of recognizing that the tra-
ditional policy of letting each of these related interests wage its own
battle for appropriations, is logically indefensible. The same idea of
unified control is much more likely now to be applied to the whole
picture of public education on all levels.
Especially is this development indicated in view of the increased
emphasis on state aid brought about by the wide-spread breakdown of
the general property tax as the financial foundation of the public
school program. State aid for weak school districts is not new. But
in the present crisis practically all school districts proved to be weak
districts, and many of them simply folded up and died. The other
sources of public revenue, outside of the general property tax, were
so generally tapped by the state for state purposes, that a new basis
for educational support became necessary if the public schools in many
states were to continue in any except the more fortunate independent
school districts.
That means, of course, that if the public elementary and high
schools are to be financed by means of a definite allotment of state-
wide taxes, such as sales taxes, let us say, the state universities and
other institutions of higher education must overcome not merely the
aversion of local taxpayers to adding to their local taxes for the sup-
port of higher education, but must wage a fight for what they consider
their share of the states' financial resources for higher education as
contrasted with elementary and secondary education as well. Under
such conditions, the urge to unify the whole program of public edu-
cation under a single state-wide agency, be it a board or a commis-
sioner, will unquestionably become stronger and stronger. If tax reve-
nues become still more restricted while the pressure for expenditures
becomes more acute, it seems unlikely that some such development
will be long delayed. If the restoration of a measure of economic
prosperity makes the pressure less serious, the development may well
be delayed for years. But apart from all the practical difficulties pre-
sented, from which the universities will unquestionably be the main
sufferers, as a proposition of public administration there seems no
denying that public education in the state being a unified whole, in
theory at least, the administrative machinery for its ultimate control
must be set up on a state-wide and all-inclusive basis.
It seems reasonable to assume that all of the interests connected
with the state universities, trustees, presidents, faculties, alumni, local
chambers of commerce, representatives and senators from institutional
counties, will struggle against this development. And I dare say from
their special point of view they will be right. That will mean that
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the ultimate outcome will be delayed, in most cases for years, and in
some cases perhaps for decades. We still have need, therefore, for
considering the governmental problems presented by the state univer-
sity as the typical situation now is.
First, then, let us consider what should be the constitutional status
of the state university. In a large number of state constitutions, par-
ticularly those revised since the close of the Civil War, we find pro-
visions concerning the state university. These provisions are of the
most varied kind and extent, and are for the most part, of course, in-
tended to throw the mantle of constitutional protection around some
aspects of the university's rights or privileges, as for instance, in the
matter of how the governing board of the university shall be chosen.
In some cases, however, the constitutional provisions were inserted in
the form of limitations instead of grants.
There have been cases where the constitutional provisions re-
specting state universities have proved important means of defense
against attacks. No doubt there have been many other cases in which
the existence of the protective provisions have prevented attacks from
being made.
However, from the point of view of political science, it may well
be asked whether there is any justification for writing into the con-
stitution provisions regarding the state university any more than pro-
visions regarding the vast number of other things that have been in-
cluded, improperly as it is generally recognized, in our state constitu-
tions. Either the provisions are so vague as to be useless, for example,
that the legislature shall establish or maintain a university of the first
class, or they fix details that may very well be of statutory, rather
than constitutional content, as the method of selecting the governing
boards.
Unless there is sound constitutional and administrative argument
for making the state university a separate co-ordinate branch of the
state government, there would seem to be little justification from the
point of view of political science for including provisions concerning
the state university in the state constitution. There is some doubt in
my own mind as to whether constitutional provisions concerning the
state university will, in the long run, prove beneficial to the more
immediate interests of the institution itself. There is none about the
governmental inadvisability of setting up even so vital a part of our
state government as the highest institution of learning as a constitu-
tional branch of administration.
Of equally fundamental importance is the taxing power. What
basis exists for the contention that the state university should have the
taxing power? In that bald form the proposition would probably be
immediately rejected as unsound from the point of view of political
science, though the taxing power is widely enjoyed by local education
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authorities. But in an indirect form the same proposition is not only
advanced as theoretically sound but is found in practice. The com-
monest form it takes is the possession by the university of endowment
in the shape of lands or "irreducible" funds under various names which
accrue to the university without action by the taxing body of the state,
the legislature.
Every university administrative official, every member of the Board
of Trustees, every intelligent individual informed on and interested
in a state university, would undoubtedly unite in a song of praise for
such funds where they exist, or in a sigh of regret where they do not
exist. But unless such funds have been the gift of some source other
than the state itself, as for instance in the case of grants by the federal
government, the existence of anything in the nature of an endowment,
that is, of permanently assured income from sources that without this
assurance would be potential sources of state revenue, is in fact tanta-
mount to the taxing power. It raises the same questions of political
science, if not of political policy, that would be raised by the grant
in the state constitution of a power of taxation.
Now as a matter of fact, some state institutions possessing such
an endowment in one form or another, have actually had the experi-
ence that the existence of such an untouchable fund has operated to
the disadvantage of the university. And in every case where the
resources of the state are inadequate for the support of basic functions
of state government, the existence of such an untouchable source of
revenue from what would otherwise be potential assets of the state
as a whole, would ultimately arouse ooposition and invite attack. From
a broad governmental point of view it would be difficult to defend the
permanent setting aside of a portion of the limited resources of a state
for a particular phase of state activity, no matter how fundamentally
important that phase might be proven to be.
In this connection it must not be overlooked, either, that state uni-
versities enjoy what is in effect a power to impose license taxes, under
the designation of tuition or fees. There are, in the actual experience
of state universities, two sides to this question also, as a matter of
policy or politics in the broadest sense. But if the university itself
enioys the power of imposing such charges, and in some states that
power is even included expressly or bv implication in the constitutional
autonomy accorded to the Board of Trustees, there is to that extent a
surrender of the taxing power of the state involved.
Next, what is the position of the Board of Trustees, or Regents,
or Governors, or Curators, or whatever the term used mav be? We
have already considered the matter of their appointment and tenure.
Characteristically they are in the position of the directors of a corpo-
ration. Why should a state university be organized as a corporation?
The reason it is so organized is largely accidental. The corporate
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form of organization was customary for American universities even in
colonial times, and was practically universal for private institutions.
For them it was an obviously logical and advantageous form of or-
ganization. They needed the power of holding and disposing of
property, the right of perpetual succession, and the right to sue and be
sued in their corporate capacity. The granting of a corporate charter
made them to that extent a creature of the state, even though the
Dartmouth College Case, with the soundness of which both in law and
public policy there has been pronounced disagreement, strictly limited
the extent of control possible by the state as a consequence of such
incorporation.
This familiar prototype we then naturally carried over to the state
university, which in some cases actually became the successor of an
existing corporation, either expressly or by gradual development. But
what are the governmental reasons for the corporate character of a
state university? The advantages, from the point of view of the insti-
tution, are obvious, even though the implications of the Dartmouth
College Case could not be applied to the state university as a corpora-
tion, since it was a public and not a private corporation. But why
should this corporate form be applied to the state university and not
to any other branch of state activity, such as the state highway depart-
ment, or the welfare department, or the national guard?
It would not appear that from a governmental point of view there
wrould be any necessity for adopting the device of corporate organiza-
tion, unless it were intended to accentuate the disparity between the
educational administration of the university and the rest of the state
administrative organization. The right to sue is not essential if the
attorney-general functions for all the state governmental agencies in
that capacity. The right to be sued in its corporate capacity is not im-
portant from the point of view of protection of the individuals con-
stituting the corporation, as in the case of the governmental sub-
divisions which are corporations, municipal or quasi-municipal. Nor is
this aspect important from the point of view of the public, since the
suability of the university in contract or tort could and possibly should
be based on the same principles that govern the suability of the state
in general.
One argument that is sometimes advanced in favor of the corporate
character of the state university is the consideration that potential in-
dividual donors who might be willing to make the university a bene-
ficiary of their generosity would not be as ready to donate their money
to the state as a whole, especially if it might be diverted to other state
purposes. There is not much legal validity to this point, however, since
the university even when it is a corporation is a public corporation,
and as such, subject to the plenary power of the state. More safe-
guarded from this point of view would seem to be the device adopted
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in some states where the university is not a corporation, namely, a
private corporation created for the purpose of receiving and adminis-
tering bequests and other gifts for the benefit of the institution.
What should be the governmental relation of the governing board
of the state university to the rest of the state government? It is, of
course, a typical administrative agency. As such, why should it not be
integrated into the general administrative organization, responsible to
the administrative head, who, under approved principles of state ad-
ministration, would be the governor? I am thoroughly familiar, of
course, with both the theoretical and the practical objections to such
an arrangement. Stripped of all trimmings they boil down to this.
Higher education is a technical subject quite beyond the understand-
ing of an average American state governor, and the basic importance
of the undertaking, combined with the fact that the level of training,
education, and common honesty of those engaged in state university
work is far above that of the political administration of the state, make
it necessary to separate this part of the state's activity from the rest
or it will suffer.
One illustration in point is the matter of financial control. I know
of no instance in which a re-organization of state financial administra-
tion has brought the operations of the state under the unified scheme
in which the efficiency of institutional management has not suffered,
even when there has been no basis for asserting that the state financial
officers have used their nuisance powers to play personal or party
politics with the institution. The financial administration of our state
universities at its best is far superior to the best success achieved by
state finance administration. At its worst, university financial adminis-
tration has probably been above the level of average state financial ad-
ministration. It is probably reasonable to assume that this will continue
to be the case for years to come.
Nevertheless, that cannot be the whole answer. Administrative
control by the legislature, exercised in many states by means of item-
ized appropriations, extending in some cases even to the individual
personnel items, is obviously unsound in both theory and practice, from
the governmental as well as the educational standpoint ; but con-
formity with sound finance administration as set up for the state as
a whole is in the long run inevitable, and may, of course, itself prove
to be the best safeguard against legislative interference.
What shall be said of personnel administration within the institu-
tion? Are the general principles of the civil service merit system
applicable to state universities? If not, why not? They are as a
matter of fact being applied in an increasing number of instances to
the non-academic or more strictly clerical and non-professional person-
nel of state universities. This application, even when modified con-
siderably in actual practice as it is in a number of cases, has been
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pretty generally deplored in state university circles. Again one may
ask, why?
Part of the answer, no doubt, must be sought in the general re-
sentment against interference of any kind with the affairs of state uni-
versities by other agencies of government—a feeling that such inter-
ference is a reflection on the integrity as well as the efficiency of state
university management. This feeling, though natural, is scarcely a
reasoned answer, and as a mere emotion it is obviously destined to
carry diminishing weight. Part of the answer, however, can reason-
ably be found in the conviction that the civil service merit system
itself as applied to state administration in general is not so much a
positive good in itself as a negative bulwark against something much
worse, namely, the spoils system.
If that conception of the civil service merit system is accepted,
then it would perhaps reasonably follow that the dangers and evils
of personnel administration abuses being manifestly less serious in
the case of state universities than in the case of state highway ad-
ministration, let us say, or tax administration, or liquor law adminis-
tration, the justification for submitting to the recognized draw-backs
of any civil service merit system would be less in the case of state
universities. But, here again, it seems clear that if and when the state-
wide application of the merit system receives general acceptance, it
will be unwise and probably futile to make a claim for excepting the
employes of state universities from such a system.
What about the teaching faculty and administrative officers and
the president of the university himself? The usefulness of a president
or an administrative officer of a university ceases when he can no
longer enlist the support of the governing board of the institution. It
can make very little difference what the reasons or alleged reasons
may be. No form of protection can be thrown around such positions
that will do more than assure the payment of a salary and the holding
of a title. In that case there is no justification for either.
As regards the faculty, the question is not so simple. It raises the
whole problem of internal administration of the state university, of
security of tenure, and of faculty participation in university govern-
ment. Whatever else they may be, faculty members of a state univer-
sity are state employees. As such, they can be protected against re-
moval only in the same way that other state employees are protected,
namely by some sort of civil service requirement as to notice and
hearing, and possibly charges and trial, "for cause" as the statutes
have it. Rut such a provision would carry with it, by implication at
least, the requirement that they should be chosen in the first place
bv some sort of open competitive process analogous to civil service
examinations.
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Now, theoretically, of course, faculty members are selected on a
competitive merit basis. And while criticism of the way in which this
works out is by no means lacking among faculty members, especially
as regards the method of promotion—another important phase of a
comprehensive civil service system—it is extremely doubtful whether
the members of any state university faculty themselves would approve
of the competitive examination method of filling vacancies on the
faculty, or the application of the common devices for examinations
for promotion within the ranks. The feeling undoubtedly would be
that the peculiar nature of a faculty member's occupation makes the
application of routine civil service merit system methods out of the
question.
It would seem that this position might be defended from a purely
political science point of view. The more varied, professionalized, in-
tangible and discretionary the functions to be performed by an em-
ployee or officer, the less suitable are competitive tests either for ap-
pointment or promotion, and the less, therefore, do the advantages of
the applications of the merit system mechanics offset the disadvantages.
But what is the other alternative?
Among a good many professors, and especially among the mem-
bership of the American Association of University Professors, the
opinion seems to prevail that the alternative lies in faculty control, or
at least faculty participation in the matter of hiring and firing, pro-
motions, retirement, etc.
Now for university administration, as an art, there is much to be
said for this point of view. But as a principle of political science, such
as invoking in a democracy the principle of the consent of the gov-
erned, the foundations of this contention seem to be pretty shaky.
Unless we start with the premise, which has long since been abandoned
in this discussion as unsound in principle and untenable in practice,
that the state university is or should be a little sovereignty of its own
within the state, above the legislature, above the governor, above the
courts, above the people even, the employees of the state, no matter
how great their dignity or exalted their title cannot, in the last analysis,
determine the conditions of their own employment.
It was my purpose to consider in this paper also, the fascinating
problems of political science raised by the state university as a govern-
mental microcosm. If we could start out with the assumption that
the state university should be and could be regarded as a little sov-
ereignty of its own, within the state but in a sense not of it, existing
side by side with the political sovereignty of the state in its other
manifestations, we should find within the organism itself problems of
government and administration presented that would tax the wisdom
of the best political scientist and the skill of the premier political
artist.
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What are the rights and duties of the faculty and other employees
of the university? How should the president be chosen? What should
be his powers, what his term of office? What are the responsibilities
and powers of the board of trustees? Who are the citizens in this
microcosm? Do the students have any "rights"? Where do parents
and alumni fit into the picture? These are only a few of the un-
answered and perhaps unanswerable questions concerning state uni-
versities, to which the application of principles of political science
offers an interesting exercise.
But the discussion has already assumed unconscionable proportions
without going into that field. And since the basic assumption on which
such an approach would be based is demonstrably unsound and im-
possible, I should certainly be accused of trying to be a brain truster
if I tackled those problems. I shall, therefore, with some regret, turn
away from that interesting speculation, and devote brief attention to
just one other aspect of the governmental problems presented by the
state university, as is. That is the situation presented by federal im-
pingement on the state university.
The whole history of the entrance of the federal government into
the field of public higher education is an interesting study in social
and political evolution. In a sense it dates back to the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, but for practical purposes it may be regarded as
having its significant beginnings in the Morrill Land Grant Act of
1862. The literature relating to this act, its application and interpre-
tation, and its subsequent expansion is already very voluminous, and
is being added to with every passing session of the Congress. Merely
to list the laws that have been added since the original act, especially
in the last decades, would give a good idea of the rate of expansion;
and of course the agricultural program of the present administration
has added a great deal more not only by law but also by administrative
decree.
It is not within the purview of this discussion to make a critical
estimate of the value of this development from an educational point of
view. Concerning the political, economic, social, and educational as-
pects of this expanding federal program, there are, of course, the
widest divergencies of opinion. But from the point of view of political
science the issue is as plain as day.
All these encroachments are clothed in the familiar guise of grants-
in-aid. And grants-in-aid, as all political scientists are aware, are one
of the most effective methods of control imaginable, because they are
the very embodiment of the principle of suaviter in modo fortiter in re.
They wear the outward appearance of voluntary co-operation, while
in reality they constitute a most potent form of domination.
In the realm of highway construction, and more recently in the
wider domains of relief and agricultural control, the take-it-or-leave-it
{ 30]
principle has demonstrated its potency over against individuals, as
well as states. In the field of higher education the familiar principle
has demonstrated its effectiveness equally clearly, though not in a
manner to be so apparent to the public not immediately concerned.
There may be room for difference of opinion as to whether these
matters should or should not be controlled by the federal government
rather than by the states. There can be no room for differences of
opinion as to whether they are so controlled. The extent to which
this control may go, moreover, is inevitably determined by the grantor,
not by the grantee. So long as money is poured into a state, the public,
and especially the state taxpayer, is little disturbed by the amount of
governmental control involved.
Let us take the most recent example of immediate concern to the
state university, the NYA or the FERA as it was formerly called.
In the last analysis, the determination of what sort of work by uni-
versity students is "socially desirable" rests of course with the relief
administrator. The fact that a large measure of freedom has actually
been left to the institutions so far, does not alter the fact that any
day the criteria may be made more rigid. Or, per contra, if the now
famous "boondoggling" becomes the pet project of the relief admin-
istration for college students, the universities will have to set up boon-
doggling projects. With ten per cent of their students in attendance
because of NYA support, state universities are going to follow the
suggestions, or even the orders of Washington as to the activities of
these students.
Now that may be a good thing. Maybe the authorities in Washing-
ton are in a better position to judge of what activities for college
students are worth while than are the colleges themselves. But it is
contrary to well-known facts to assert that this does not involve federal
control. In the case of some of the state agricultural and mechanical
colleges the situation has already developed to the extreme. In all land
grant institutions, it is a potential and in many of them an actual
question as to how much autonomy over against the federal govern-
ment is left.
To sum up, then. The state university is an interesting laboratory
for the political scientist. It is not and cannot be a distinct sovereignty
concerned only with its own "educational" problems. It is inevitably
subject to a considerable measure of control, and in the last analysis
the measure of this control will be roughly proportionate to the
financial contribution made out of public moneys, whether by direct
taxation or in the form of endowment. This control may come, not
merely from the state, but also from the federal government, roughly
again in the ratio that the federal contributions bear to the total in-
come. The problems of internal administration of the university are
peculiar and interesting phases of public administration which must,
(31 }
of necessity, be viewed in the light of the relationship of the under-
taking to the body politic as a whole. The state university affords
illustrations of the manner in which generally accepted principles of
public administration may require modification. It has not yet, it
would seem, furnished material for the formulation of new principles.
{ 32 }
PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE

PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE 1
By Leonard D. White
Member of the United States Civil Service Commission, and Professor
of Public Administration, University of Chicago
Opportunities for the university graduate in government work have
become so numerous and varied that I cannot undertake to describe
or even refer to all of them. I propose to deal only with opportunities
in the national government, emphasizing especially careers in the
permanent civil service.
In passing, however, I must remind you that interesting openings
for university men and women are available in the states and cities.
Most of these are in scientific and professional lines; engineering,
public health, education and libraries, social service, forestry, and con-
servation presenting familiar illustrations.
New life and interest in state and local government are stirring as
a result of more extensive cooperation between Washington on the one
hand and state capitols and city halls on the other. Federal-state re-
lationships between the Department of Agriculture and state agricul-
tural experiment stations are a well-known example. Cooperative
arrangements in the management of employment offices under the
Wagner- Peyser Act and joint programs in the complex field of the
Social Security Act illustrate a new type of government opportunity
which is rapidly developing midway between the national government
and the states. The states deserve, and unless they are to fail in their
responsibilities, will require a greater proportion of men and women
trained in their state universities.
I cannot refrain, also, from passing reference to the new vocation
of technical consultant on government problems. The origins of this
rapidly expanding group reach back to the foundation of the New
York Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906. Present opportunities
for employment as consultant are found in the many bureaus of gov-
ernmental research, in the state leagues of municipalities, and in as-
sociations of state and local government officials, the headquarters of
many of which are in Chicago. The demand by busy and perplexed
officials for the impartial advice of these consulting experts is growing
by leaps and bounds. They have already become one of the important
agencies for administrative improvement in national, state, and local
government.
'Delivered April 28, 1937.
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Our present interest, however, is the federal service. May we begin
by clearing the ground of a few of the illusions which many people,
even some university students, still cherish. For example, there is an
opinion abroad that no really first-class man or woman would choose
the civil service as a career. In all earnestness and with all possible
emphasis I say that this opinion has no foundation in fact. Where
among the engineers of his generation could be found a more dis-
tinguished member of his profession than the late Elwood Mead, for
years Director of the Reclamation Service? Who in the ranks of the
natural sciences is more entitled to respect and honor for his scien-
tific accomplishments than Dr. Lyman J. Briggs, Director of the
Bureau of Standards? Where in the field of personnel management
can a more eminent practitioner be found that Dr. W. W. Stock-
berger of the Department of Agriculture, or among the statisticians
one more able than E. Dana Durand, now a member of the Tariff
Commission? Whose reputation in the field of transportation eco-
nomics excels that of Joseph B. Eastman, for many years a member of
the Interstate Commerce Commission ? These are men who have made
the public service their life work. He who thinks that the public
service does not attract men and women of first rank or who fears
that a government career would deprive him of contact with first-rate
minds is simply ignorant of the quality of the public service of today.
Another opinion held by uninformed persons is that no really man-
sized jobs exist in the civil service. This view, also, reflects a profound
ignorance of the nature and scope of the tasks of modern govern-
ment. One of my former students had for some time under his juris-
diction 29,000,000 acres of land for purposes of soil erosion control,
and over this vast domain were moving whole armies of workers, a
problem of management and direction of first magnitude. A very
different and a very difficult job is the work of the conciliator in labor
disputes—not a position for a man who cannot stand the heavy wear
and tear of controversy. A preliminary task of the Social Security
Board was to register 26,000,000 persons eligible to participate in the
unemployment insurance benefits of the Act. An incidental problem
faced by the Civil Works Administration on November 15, 1934, was
the mailing of individual checks to 4,000,000 Civil Works Administra-
tion workers in all parts of the country.
The old agencies, too, have their large-scale problems. To give
you a modest illustration, I may refer to the task of the Civil Service
Commission which last year examined three-quarters of a million
persons; examinations are held at over 3,500 points in all parts of
the United States. It is no simple matter merely to have the right
number of examination papers at the right place at the right time.
This is nothing, however, compared to the task of the Comptroller
General who must audit not only the transactions of the old depart-
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ments and agencies, but also the millions of vouchers produced by
almost any one of the new. In short, able men and women are making
the public service their life work, and their job is as big as they are.
Many uninformed persons believe that civil service employees are
easy-going, not to say lazy, and soon fall into an inevitable rut. On
this point Mr. Eastman made the following observation at the recent
semi-centennial celebration of the Interstate Commerce Commission:
As one who has had twenty-three years' experience in the public ser-
vice, nothing arouses my anger more than the idea which so many entertain
who are without experience that public employees are a lazy-time-saving
lot of mediocre ability, and lacking in initiative. I have never found them
so. On the contrary the thing that has always impressed me has been their
extraordinary readiness to put their souls into the job and often to endure
overtime work without pay, when on the whole they gain so little recogni-
tion for their work.
A recent study of reported overtime showed almost 14,000,000
hours in the whole federal service in a period of six months, equiva-
lent to about 28,000,000 hours a year. This is not the record of an
easy-going organization.
Another misunderstanding is that all the good jobs go to poli-
ticians. It is true that they have too many. But there are now over
500,000 positions in the federal civil service ; thousands of these in-
volve high responsibility and are regularly filled by promotion from
below. Professor Macmahon of Columbia University demonstrated
ten years ago that most bureau chiefs are career men. The situation
in the civil service agencies has not changed for the worse since his
study.
In an organization as huge as the federal civil service one may fear
to get lost and eventually become only a very small cog on a very
small wheel of a very intricate machine. The civil service is a huge
organization, but like a great university, it falls into separate units,
each of which has its own esprit dc corps, and within each of which
one may build up pleasant and effective working relationships. The
University of Illinois with its thousands of students may very well
seem to the freshman who comes to its campus for the first time a
forbidding and complex organization. He quickly learns, however,
that the university is a group of schools and departments, and that
within e?.ch, individual professors and their students come into close
and friendly contact.
During the last few years university and college graduates have
entered the civil service in larger numbers than ever before. Cynics
say that this is a temporary trend, due to the depression. Lack of em-
ployment elsewhere has certainly played a part in the new interest of
graduates in the public service, but this is too shallow to serve as a
complete explanation. The crisis in our economic and governmental
svstem and a realization of the vital importance of government in
{ 37)
working out our economic salvation have challenged the imagination
of college men and women. They have discerned a major task and
are anxious to take a part in it.
The scope of civil service openings is suggested by some simple
figures. On June 30, 1936, there were 498,000 positions in the federal
civil service. The normal annual appointments for replacement pur-
poses range between 40,000 and 50,000. About half of these are in
the post office, where career opportunities for university men and
women have not yet been developed. In the rest of the service a fair
estimate of the annual number of junior professional and scientific
appointments and junior clerical appointments from college registers
is 3,000 to 3,500. This is a relatively steady demand and does not take
into account needs caused by expansion of the service.
Appointments to these positions are made on the basis of open
competitive examination. The competition is strenuous, and under
present conditions a college or university graduate in the lower half
of his class has a slender chance either of passing the examinations
or of securing an appointment. The beneficial effect of this situation
upon the character of the public service will be projected far into the
future.
We may now pass directly to a brief survey of the principal ex-
aminations which provide the normal avenue of entrance to a civil
service appointment. These examinations fall into two major groups.
On the one hand there are examinations in the professional and scien-
tific field, including economics and the social sciences. On the other
hand, there are examinations leading into the clerical, administrative,
and fiscal service, to which the United States Civil Service Commission
has made some notable additions in recent years.
The professional and scientific branch of the federal service has
grown rapidly in recent years. A study published by the Census
Bureau in 1896 revealed about 3,600 professional and scientific posi-
tions, two percent of the total employment. In 1930 the number of
professional and scientific positions had increased to over 35,000 and
amounted to about six percent of the total service. At present we may
estimate at least 40,000, not including over 10,000 more in the non-
civil-service agencies. We will consider engineering, agricultural and
biological sciences,- medicine, law, economics and social science.
Engineering
The federal service requires engineers in practically every special-
ized field. Among the agencies to which engineers are supplied by
the United States Civil Service Commission are the Engineer Depart-
ment at large, the Navy, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Reclamation
Service, the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau of Mines, the
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Geological Survey, the Forest Service, and the Procurement Division.
Many such engineers are concerned primarily with research. Thus
engineers in the Bureau of Standards, aeronautical engineers at
Langley Field, highway engineers in the Bureau of Public Roads,
Bureau of Agricultural Engineering, Forest Products Laboratory, at
Madison, Wisconsin, Naval Research Laboratory, are deeply concerned
with research problems.
For the engineering field the United States Civil Service Com-
mission usually holds once a year a comprehensive examination for
junior engineers, as well as specialized examinations for higher grades.
In September, 1935, an examination was announced for junior engi-
neer in the following optional subjects: Aeronautical, agricultural,
ceramics, chemical, civil, electrical, mechanical, mining, petroleum, and
structural steel and concrete. The options vary somewhat from year
to year. This examination is the normal avenue of entrance to the
engineering field. The prerequisites are graduation from a college or
university of recognized standing, requiring the completion of a full
four-year course, and a maximum age limit of thirty-five. Original
appointments are at $2,000 a year, the standard rate for all junior
professional appointments.
The United States Civil Service Commission also holds from time
to time a student engineer examination for seasonal employment
during the summer. For illustration, I refer to the student engineer
examination announced in June, 1936, with optional subjects in chemi-
cal engineering, civil and highway engineering, electrical and mechani-
cal engineering. The Bureau of Public Roads and the Engineer Depart-
ment at large use this examination as a testing ground for students
who are completing their junior year, giving them a summer appoint-
ment, at the end of which they return for the final year of their en-
gineering work. After taking their engineering degree, they may then
qualify as junior engineers upon passing a noncompetitive examination.
In addition to these junior examinations the Commission holds
from time to time examinations for higher and more specialized en-
gineering positions with salaries running up to $5,600 and occasionally
$6,500 per anuum.
Agricultural and biological sciences
The second major group of scientific and professional examinations
is concerned with the agricultural and biological sciences, leading to
appointment principally in the Department of Agriculture, one of the
great research scientific institutions of the country. This department
includes the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service, as well
as the former Resettlement Administration. The 1935 announcement
included junior entomologist, forest pathologist, plant physiologist.
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plant quarantine inspector, and pomologist. The 1936 announcement
carried ten options, including among others junior agronomist,
biologist, soil technologist, and zoologist. While the specialties will
vary somewhat from year to year, the basic biological sciences are
regularly represented.
Here it is appropriate to refer to the examination for junior
forester and junior range examiner. These examinations are required
once a year, and the demand for qualified men is brisk. The prerequi-
site for the junior forester examination is a full four-year course
leading to a bachelor's degree from a forestry school of recognized
standing, or from the forestry department of a college or university,
or a master's degree in forestry in addition to a bachelor's degree in
some field other than forestry. Senior graduate students are regularly
admitted in this as in many professional examinations. A similar ex-
amination is that for park ranger, National Park Service, except that
the educational prerequisites are much less severe.
Medicine
Practically the entire medical service maintained by the national
government is under civil service regulations. Three great branches
are the United States Public Health Service, the Veterans' Adminis-
tration, and the Indian Service. Examinations for medical officer are
held from time to time for appointments in these well-known medical
services. The medical staff of the famous St. Elizabeth's Hospital,
Washington, D. C, is also maintained through examinations offered
bv the United States Civil Service Commission.
Law
The only professional and scientific field which is not generally
recruited by the Commission is law. Most appointments to the junior
attorney positions are outside the civil service system. Several im-
portant exceptions, however, exist, to wit, attorney positions in the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Veterans' Administration, the
Federal Communications Commission, and the Employees Compen-
sation Commission. Examinations for law positions are held from time
to time. By way of illustration, I refer to an examination announced
in 1934 for the Federal Communications Commission, carrying ap-
pointments ranging from $2,000 to $5,600 per annum.
Appointments to attorney positions in other departments and
agencies are usually made directly by the General Counsel. In many
instances the General Counsel writes to the deans of the law schools
for recommendations. Many excellent appointments are made in this
way, although I believe that equally satisfactory results could be
secured for the junior attorney positions by means of a properly
constructed competitive examination.
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Economics
May we turn from these older professions to the somewhat more
modern group, the economists and the statisticians. In 1896 it appears
that the Government employed only 87 statisticians. Apparently the
only economist was one "economic ornithologist" in the Department
of Agriculture. From these slender beginnings the demand for econo-
mists and statisticians has expanded until we now find an estimated
1600. They are found principally in the field of agricultural economics,
social economics, and business economics. The agencies in which the
greatest expansion has occurred are Agriculture, Labor, Farm Credit
Administration, and the Social Security Board.
One or two illustrations of the type of work in the higher realms
of government economics may be of interest. The Executive Secretarv
and Director of Research of the Central Statistical Board, a position
paying $8,000 per annum, has these duties:
1. Directing all investigations undertaken by the Board.
2. Making plans and formulating policies for the work of the staff.
3. Acting as chief contact officer of the Board in negotiating with
the technical, professional and working staffs of other organizations.
4. Preparing final reports upon all work undertaken.
5. Keeping accurately informed of current developments in the
statistical services.
This work is "original and almost entirely supervisory, requiring the
highest order of initiative, judgment, and independent thinking."
The work of chief economist of the Mineral Production and Eco-
nomics Division of the Bureau of Mines ranges over a broad field. He
conducts primary economic and statistical research on problems of the
mining industry, as well as difficult analytical studies concerning the
relationship of various mineral groups to each other. Illustrative cases
include the study of potential supplies of monetary metals in relation
to the price level ; development of techniques for forecasting demand
for copper, lead, zinc, coal, and other minerals ; capacity of the mining
industry to absorb labor at various levels of economic recovery ; rela-
tion of reclaimed metal supplies to future rates of reserve depletion.
Conference with other economic and statistical units is frequent. The
position is paid on a scale from $4,600 to $5,400.
What examinations lead to such exalted positions? A number of
specialized examinations in economics are likely to be announced in
any year, as for example, junior agricultural economist, junior financial
economist, and junior social economist. In 1936, the Commission an-
nounced a general examination for economist, including positions
ranging from $2,600 to $5,600 a year. This examination wTas intended
to cover all fields within the broad subject of economics except home
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economics and social economics. The results were satisfactory, and a
general examination in the field of economics is likely to be repeated
from time to time.
In the closely related field of statistics the Commission holds a
series of general and specialized examinations. The principal en-
trance gate is the test for assistant statistical clerk. Specialized ex-
aminations in the higher grades are held from time to time, carrying
salaries from $2,600 a year to $5,600 a year. At the top of the statis-
tical hierarchy we find the examination for assistant commissioner of
labor statistics at $6,500 per annum.
Social science
New programs of government work have created a new demand
for social scientists. The United States Civil Service Commission
is experimenting to find the best way of securing highly qualified
personnel trained in one or more of the social sciences.
The most recent experiment in the social science field is the ex-
amination for social science analyst. This examination is of such
general interest to college seniors and graduates that it is desirable to
examine it for a moment. The initiative for the examination came
from the Research Division of the Social Security Board. Interest,
however, quickly spread to other agencies, including the Central
Statistical Board. The examination is held with three optional
subjects: economics, sociology and social research, and political science.
The prerequisite for the junior social science analyst is successful
completion of a full four-year course leading to a bachelor's degree
in one of the social sciences, senior students being admitted subject to
proof of receiving a diploma at a later date. The assistant grade,
commencing at $2,600 a year, requires in addition two years of post-
graduate study, or two years of full-time experience in teaching a
social science, or two years professional or research experience in the
optional subject, or any time equivalent of these. The requirements for
the higher grades, which rise to $5,600 a year, vary with the grade.
We hope that this examination may become a convenient means of
recruiting economists, political scientists, and sociologists.
Recent discussion of careers in government has been directed
toward the increasing number of administrative supervisory positions.
Administration as such, however, is not yet a frequent subject of
examination by the United States Civil Service Commission.
The Commission is experimenting in this field in response to the
increasing demand for qualified administrative personnel. For in-
stance, in 1936 for the first time in its history, the Commission held
an examination for personnel officer, and secured a small register of
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well-qualified applicants. This type of examination will doubtless be
repeated from time to time, inasmuch as the demand for personnel
officers in the Federal service is increasing steadily.
Another illustration is the recent examination for administrative
officer for the Social Security Board, covering positions ranging from
$3,200 a year to $5,600 a year. Such examinations point to the gradual
recognition of administrative service as a special type of work. At
the present time, however, it is premature for college or university
students to prepare specifically for this type of work in government.
One other examination of special interest to the liberal arts student
whose asset is a broad education remains. This is the test for junior
civil service examiner. This examination was developed in 1934 with
the hope that it might serve as a convenient means of permitting the
nonspecialized liberal arts college graduate to enter the Federal service.
The results have far exceeded our expectations. In the 1934 competi-
tion over 7,000 college graduates took part, of whom the severe general
intelligence test eliminated about one-half. During the last two years
the Commission has placed over 1,200 men and women from this
register in a wide variety of positions and in nearly twenty different
departments and agencies. The examination was given again in the
summer of 1936, attracting 21,000 competitors, of whom 6,400 passed
the examination and are now available for certification to the depart-
ments. This register is popular with the appointing officers, and it
seems reasonable to suppose that it will provide the principal means by
which the nonspecialized liberal arts college and university student
may enter the Federal service in substantial numbers.
These are the principal but by no means the only examinations of
interest to college and university graduates. All announcements are
posted in the first-class and second-class post offices, all college grade
announcements are sent to every college and university, and individual
notice for specified examinations can be arranged upon request.
One important question remains. What is the probable financial
return to college men and women in the Federal civil service? The
entrance rate of pay for scientific and professional positions is $2,000
a year. The highest rate under present pay scales is from $8,000 to
$9,000 a year. In the clerical, administrative, and fiscal service, a
common entrance rate is $1,620 a year, rising to the same maximum,
$8,000 to $9,000 a year. The rate of progress from the bottom rung
of the ladder to the top depends on the same circumstances as else-
where, and no general statement can be made. Unusually competent
men and women, however, move up rapidly—certainly as rapidly in
my judgment as in the field of college and university teaching. In the
government service, as in private employment, there is an insatiable
demand for exceptionally qualified employees.
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Choice of a life work is governed in each individual case by a com-
plex set of imponderables. Not everyone should try to enter the public
service. Those who wish to amass a fortune should stay in the world
of private enterprise. Those who prefer to work alone, free from
supervision and direction and the requirements of teamwork, should
stay out of public offices. Those whose working habits are impulsive,
who are driven to work feverishly for two or three days and nights
and who then expect to loaf for a week, will find adjustment to the
more settled ways of government offices rather difficult.
Is it, then, worth while to prepare for the civil service? May I
repeat the answer to this question which I gave in a recent article in
Scribner's Magazine. "For the individual who seeks a spectacular
career, who desires to wield public influence publicly, or who wants to
make money, I would say, no. But there are young men and women
who want to work with one of the principal agencies for the progres-
sive improvement of our national life, who are content with private
sources of personal satisfaction, who command patience, and who can
be satisfied, if successful, with an eventual income of six or seven
thousand dollars a year. For them the public service has much to offer,
and they are choosing it for their life work. They are marching
forward confidently to take over administrative responsibilities which
older hands are relinquishing year by year. The public service will
not suffer when they come of age."
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Last spring, in the thick of the fight on the President's Supreme Court
proposal. Congressman Rankin from Mississippi introduced a resolu-
tion in the House of Representatives. This provided that the Supreme
Court should return to its old and modest quarters in the Capitol
Building, and that the new ten million dollar Supreme Court palace
should be turned into a library in memory of Thomas Jefferson, the
great apostle of American democracy. In this jocularly cynical pro-
posal Mr. Rankin seems to suggest an incompatibility between an
increasingly powerful Supreme Court and the principles of democratic
government. He did not originate that idea. Back in 1801 Jefferson
wrote to a friend: "The Federalists have retired into the judiciary as
a stronghold—and from that battery all the works of republicanism
are to be beaten down and erased." Some people to-day believe that
in a democracy no court should have power to invalidate laws passed
by the representatives of the people. Many others believe that we need
a Supreme Court with power to declare laws unconstitutional ; but they
also feel that in the use of that authority the Court has dangerously
assumed powers which belong to the legislature, powers which in a
democratic government ought not to be exercised by a court of law.
This is the problem which I wish to explore. What is the role of the
Supreme Court in our constitutional democracy ?
I should like to divide my discussion into three parts. I should like
first to show the nature and growth of the Supreme Court's power to
invalidate laws. Secondly, I wish to show that the Court in reviewing
legislation determines not merely the constitutionality of law but the
wisdom and desirability of legislative policy. Third, I shall explain how
I think the Supreme Court can best be restored to its proper role in a
democratic government.
I. The nature and growth of the Supreme Court's
power over legislation
Let us turn to the first of these three topics,—the nature and growth
of the Supreme Court's power over legislation. I do not enter here
upon any analysis of the theory of judicial review. I do not wish to
delivered March 9, 1938.
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make any comment upon the old, old dispute as to whether the framers
of the Constitution intended to have the Supreme Court invalidate acts
of Congress. We may accept judicial review as a going concern with-
out worrying about its lineage. I should like, however, to trace the
stages in the development of the power of the Supreme Court to
declare laws unconstitutional, from the rather modest beginning in
John Marshall's famous decision in the case of Marbury v. Madison, 2
to the broad and drastic power which the Court now enjoys. This will
make more clear the actual working relations between the Supreme
Court and the Congress. There are at least four stages in this evolution
of the Court's power, and these I wish to discuss.
First, let us examine briefly the case in which the Supreme Court
first declared an act of Congress unconstitutional. This was the case
of Marbury v. Madison, well known to every college student. Presi-
dent John Adams, about to retire from office, had appointed some sixty
loyal Federalists to judicial positions created two weeks earlier by
the Judiciary Act of 1801. The commissions of all these appointees
had been signed and sealed, but John Marshall, Adams's easy-going
Secretary of State, had not gotten around to deliver them when at
midnight on March 3rd Thomas Jefferson, the newly elected President,
took office. Jefferson regarded these so-called "midnight" appoint-
ments to be an outrageous assault upon the principles of democratic
government and common decency and ordered his Secretary of State,
James Madison, not to deliver the commissions still left in the office.
One of these had been destined to make James Marbury a justice of
the peace in the District of Columbia, and Marbury, not wishing to be
done out of his job, brought an action in the Supreme Court of the
United States to compel Madison to give him his commission. He
brought his suit under a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which
authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus and
prohibition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. After much
delay the case reached the Supreme Court in 1803 and Marshall, as
Chief Justice of the United States, was confronted with the fruits of
his own negligence. The Court's decision and Marshall's opinion
announcing it made history. Marshall began by scolding the Adminis-
tration for not delivering Marbury's commission to which he was
clearly entitled. This was just the kind of case in which it would be
proper to mandamus Madison to deliver the commission. Unfortun-
ately, however, this could not be done because the section of the
Judiciary Act purporting to give the Supreme Court the power to
issue a mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction was
unconstitutional. The Constitution clearly states the limits of the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and those limits Congress
may not change. It could not, therefore, authorize the issuance of
2
i Cranch 237, 1803.
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mandamus in original actions. The law purporting to give this new
jurisdiction conflicts with the Constitution, and the Supreme Court,
sworn to uphold the Constitution, must refuse to enforce the invalid
statute. Thus was the doctrine of judicial review announced by the
Supreme Court.
Now there are two facts about Marbury v. Madison which should
be carefully noted. In the first place, the act of Congress held void
was an act in which Congress had, in the Court's opinion, uncon-
stitutionally tampered with the Court's own jurisdiction. It had tried
to give to the Court powers which could not validly be given and the
Court had protected itself against this legislative assault on its own
integrity. Jefferson himself could not logically quarrel with the basic
theory of the Court's action. He believed that each of the three
departments of the Government must interpret the Constitution in so
far as it bears upon its own powers and status, and may properly
follow its own interpretation. No department is bound by the con-
stitutional interpretation of any other department. In Marbury v.
Madison the Court is simply saying to the Congress, "You must keep
your hands off from us. You cannot enlarge our jurisdiction beyond
constitutional limits." While some of Marshall's language is more
generous, the case of Marbury v. Madison, viewed on its facts, does
not establish the power of the Court to reach over its own fence and
pass upon the validity of Congressional or Presidential acts which in no
way affect the prerogatives or jurisdiction of the Court itself. Marshall
nowhere asserts the superiority of the Court over Congress or the
Executive, nor does he lay claim on the Court's behalf to any general
power of supervision over the other two departments. In the second
place, no other act of Congress was invalidated until the Dred Scott
case in 1857. 3 If the Supreme Court, under the doctrine of Marbury
v. Madison, was supposed to enjoy the broad power to supervise the
constitutional correctness with which Congress and the President
exercised their own powers, it is rather surprising that during the
fifty years following no attempt was made to seek the Court's decision
as to the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States,4 a pro-
tective tariff, the acquisition of Louisiana, the annexation of Texas,
and numerous other legislative or executive acts which aroused bitter
constitutional dispute.
The second stage in the development of the power of judicial re-
view was reached in the Dred Scott case decided in 1857. We cannot
go into the fascinating story of this great case. It is enough for our
purposes to know that the Court held that a negro slave could not
3Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard 393, 1857.
4
It will be remembered that McCullocfa v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 1819,
in which the power of Congress to charter the Bank was upheld, was not started
as an attack on the constitutionality of the Bank but as an attack on the right
of the State of Maryland to tax it.
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become a citizen of the United States, and that the Missouri Com-
promise Act of 1820, which forbade slavery in the federal territories
north of 36°3o", was unconstitutional. In thus forbidding slavery in
the territories Congress had exercised a power not granted to it in the
Constitution, a power which could not validly be implied from the
delegated power to govern the territories. This represents an important
enlargement of the scope of judicial review over the doctrine of
Marbury v. Madison. Marshall's early decision had held that the Court
could refuse to enforce laws purporting to change its own jurisdiction
when the Court believed those laws to be invalid. In the Dred Scott
case Taney and his colleagues go much further. They hold that the
judgment of Congress as to the scope of one of its own legislative
powers, this time a power in no way concerning the Court, is wrong
and that the act so passed is unconstitutional. The Court, in other
words, takes on the task of determining whether Congress has exer-
cised powers which the Constitution has not delegated to it. Congress
must stay in its own constitutional backyard and the Supreme Court,
not Congress, is to determine whether it has done so.
The third stage in the growth of judicial guardianship over legisla-
tion came in the late eighties with the emergence of the Court's modern
doctrine of due process of law. Here the Court added to its power of
deciding whether Congress exercised undelegated power the much more
far-reaching power of deciding whether Congress has exercised dele-
gated power in an improper manner. Due process of law is a test, not
of the existence of legislative power, but of the method of its exercise.
The story back of this can be sketched only in the briefest way. The
guarantee of due process of law traces its ancestory back to Magna
Charta. After many permutations we find it set forth in the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Bill of Rights. There we read, "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." Similar clauses are found in most state constitutions, and in
1868 the Fourteenth Amendment included an identical due process
clause which applies to the states. The early history of due process of
law was not spectacular. For a hundred years due process was held
to be a limitation upon governmental procedure and not uoon the
substance or content of legislative policy. It required notice and
hearing and a fair trial, but it did not forbid the legislature to regulate
a social or economic problem. After the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted the Supreme Court, in its first case construing it,5 held that
the due process clause had no relevance to, and could not, therefore,
forbid an arbitrary state police regulation setting up a slaughterhouse
monopoly in New Orleans. Due process seemed destined to remain
the "forgotten clause" of the Constitution. Rut vast economic changes
5The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36, 1873.
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were taking place. The states began to deal with social and economic
problems through more drastic exercises of their police powers, while
the regulatory powers of Congress, especially under the commerce
clause, were pushed far beyond previous limits. All this legislative
activity was a sharp challenge to our American pioneer philosophy of
laisses faire. Vested interests felt keenly the need of a constitutional
weapon with which to combat the onward march of the new social
control, and after a period of some wavering and uncertainty the
Supreme Court, abandoning the precedents of a hundred years, con-
verted the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments into judicial yardsticks by which to measure the validity of the
substance and content of social legislation. Under the new rule a state
or federal law was void as a denial of due process of law if in the
opinion of the Court in impinged in an "arbitrary" manner upon the
liberty or property rights of the individual. This step, taken without
ostentation, constituted the greatest expansion of the Court's power
to review legislation which has thus far occurred. Let me give a single
illustration of the way in which the new doctrine enlarged judicial
power. In 1898 Congress passed the Erdman Act regulating interstate
railroads. One section of that act, aimed at the promotion of collective
bargaining, forbade any interstate railroad to discharge one of its men
because he belonged to a labor union. The Supreme Court held the
act void on two grounds. 6 It held first that this provision was not a
regulation of interstate commerce because the relations between the
railroad and its men had nothing to do with interstate commerce and
did not, therefore, fall within the delegated power of Congress to
regulate that commerce. It held, secondly, that, even if Congress had
exercised its commerce power in passing the act, it had exercised it in
so arbitrary and unreasonable a manner as to deprive the railroads of
their liberty and property without due process of law. Congress had
tried to exercise a power it did not have; but even it had had the
power it had exercised it in an unconstitutional manner.
There is a fourth step in the development I am tracing. By it the
Court has added to its scrutiny of the constitutional propriety of the
method by which a granted power has been exercised by Congress, the
further job of judging the constitutional propriety of the purpose for
which the power has been used. This new technique was first employed
in invalidating the first federal child labor act in 1918 in the case of
Hammer v. Dagenhart. 7 This act had forbidden the shipment in inter-
state commerce of the products of mines and factories in which chil-
dren were employed in violation of standards set up in the act. In a
five-to-four decision this was held void on two grounds. First, child
labor is not closely enough connected with interstate commerce to make
"Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 1906.
'247 U.S. 251, 1918.
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the statute a bona fide exercise of the delegated power to regulate
commerce. Secondly, even if the statute wei'e' a bona fide exercise of
the commerce power, it was an exercise of the commerce power for an
unconstitutional purpose, namely the regulation of child labor, a matter
lying within the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amend-
ment. Three New Deal measures of importance were invalidated on
this same ground, that they constituted exercises of valid federal
powers for invalid purposes. These acts were the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, 8 the Municipal Bankruptcy Act, 9 and the Guffy Coal Act. 10
In invalidating the AAA in the Butler Case Mr. Justice Roberts did not
hold the processing taxes and pay crop reduction benefits void on the
ground that Congress was not exercising its delegated power to spend
money. He held it void because the tax was levied in order to raise
money to be spent for financing a scheme for the regulation of agri-
culture, an object which lies outside the delegated powers of Congress.
The power was there, the method was regular, but the purpose was
wrong. The Court has thus extended its supervision to the motives
which have led Congress to exercise its delegated powers. "Thus,"
as Mr. Justice Cardozo put it, "the process of psychoanalysis has
spread to unaccustomed fields." 11
To summarize this whole growth of judicial power, we find the
Court at the outset protecting itself and its jurisdiction from uncon-
stitutional interference by Congress. It next assumed the power to
keep Congress from exercising powers not delegated to it by the Con-
stitution. By a third step, the Court took over the authority to see that
Congress and the States do not exercise their admitted powers by
methods which seem to the Court to be arbitrary. Finally, the Court
has undertaken to scrutinize legislative motives and to invalidate
exercises of valid powers, by valid methods, but for wrongful purposes.
Thus the judicial camel has got himself pretty completely into the
legislative tent.
II. The legislative and policy-determining character of the Supreme
Court's power to declare laws void
This brings me to the second major part of my discussion—the
substitution, through the Court's power of judicial review, of judicial
for legislative judgments on major questions of legislative policy. Has
this come about in any large measure? If so, how has it come about,
and with what practical results? My own view is that the Supreme
Court now exercises wide power over the actual content of legislative
8Held void in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 1036.
9Held void in Ashton v. Cameron County Water District No. i, 298 U.S.
513, 1936.
,0Held void in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 1936.
"United States v. Constantine, 206 U.S. 287, 1935. Mr. Justice Cardozo dis-
sented in this case.
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policy. A very large proportion of the social and economic legislation
invalidated in recent years has been held void not because it conflicted
clearly and unmistakably with the clauses of the Constitution, but
because a majority of the members of the Supreme Court believed the
legislation to be economically unsound and objectionable. The Court
exercises what I believe to be essentially a legislative veto. It is doing
the legislature's job over again.
I am well aware that this charge would be sternly denied by the
Supreme Court. As Professor Thomas Reed Powell has neatly put it,
the Court has a very keen appreciation of "the role of rigmarole" in
the judicial process. Proceeding on the theory "let not thy left hand
know what thy right hand doeth" the Court continues to insist that
the invalidating of a statute is an almost mechanical judicial process
in which there is no room for personal opinion as to the social or
economic merits of the legislation involved. In the very process of
holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act void on grounds so strained
and loosely reasoned as to reach almost a new low in judicial technique,
Mr. Justice Roberts takes time out to restate the old orthodox
incantation:
"When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the Courts
as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of
the Government has only one duty—to lay the article of the Constitu-
tion which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged—and to
decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the Court does,
or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question." 12
All of which sounds as though the justices, with the aid of compasses
and slide rules, should reach a perfectly accurate result with which
there can be no disagreement.
Now, certain clauses of the Constitution can be interpreted by the
Supreme Court in this coldly mechanical manner. If Congress should
fix federal income tax rates at a higher level in Illinois than in New
York there could not be the slightest doubt that such an act violates
the requirement of geographical uniformity in accordance with which
the Constitution states that such taxes must be levied. It would be
possible for Congress to regulate criminal procedure in the federal
courts in such a way as to violate the provisions of the federal Bill
of Rights guaranteeing trial by jury, or protection against compulsory
self-incrimination. It may be readily agreed that in such cases the
Court could put the statute and the constitutional provision side by
side and see at a glance that they do not jibe. Cases of this kind are
exceedingly rare. They are rare because legislatures are not likely to
indulge in self-advertised violations of the Constitution.
But these are not the cases in which the validity of social and eco-
2United States v. Butler, note 8, supra.
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nomic legislation is involved or in which broad questions of legislative
policy are at issue. If we examine the cases in which important legis-
lative measures have been held by the Supreme Court to be valid or
to be invalid over the last twenty years, we shall see that the constitu-
tional provisions which these laws are supposed to violate do not have
any clear, certain, and established meaning. What, for instance, are the
major constitutional issues on which the validity of the principal New
Deal measures turned ? They are three in number. First, has Congress
exercised some power not delegated to it? Or, concretely, can you
reasonably hang the National Industrial Recovery Act on the constitu-
tional "peg" of the commerce power, which Congress thought it was
exercising when it passed the statute? Second, has Congress, or have
the states, exercised some power in a manner so arbitrary or unreason-
able as to amount to a deprivation of liberty or property without due
process of law? Third, has Congress exercised some delegated power,
such as the commerce power or the taxing power, for a purpose be-
lieved by the Court to be unconstitutional? There are no sharp clear
lines here between the constitutional and the unconstitutional, no
categories of black and white, and in settling these issues the Court
has come to exercise a type of judgment and discretion which is essen-
tially legislative in character. Let us examine more closely just how
the judicial process actually works in dealing with problems of this sort.
Let us turn first to the Minimum Wage Cases. In 1923 the Su-
preme Court by a five-to-three decision held that the due process
clauses of the Constitution guarantee the right to pay women and
children starvation wages. 13 The Court clung to this shocking doctrine
until last year when it held by a five-to-four vote that its previous
decision was wrong and that minimum wage laws for women and
minors do not deny due process of law. 14 Now what actually happened
here? A minimum wage law is an exercise of what we call the police
power. The police power is that vital power of the American states to
legislate for the public welfare. More specifically it is the power of the
state to restrict individual freedom of action, or the free use of private
property, in order to protect the health, morals, good order, con-
venience, or general welfare. A parking regulation, a quarantine of
contagious disease, or an act forbidding gambling is each an exercise of
the police power. Each exercise of the police power contains two
elements. It restricts individual liberty and it protects or promotes
some public social interest. The Court's task when it applies the test
of due process of law to a legislative exercise of the police power is
to weigh these two conflicting interests one against the other. If, in
the opinion of the Court, the restriction upon individual liberty out-
,3 \dkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. ^25, 1923.
"West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 1937.
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weighs the social advantage claimed for the act, then it denies due
process of law. Thus a majority of the Court prior to March, 1937,
believed that minimum wage laws imposed upon employers and em-
ployees a burdensome restriction of their right to make free contracts
with each other about wages, and that this restriction was not offset
or compensated for by any equivalent social gain. The valued right of
women and minors to work for next to nothing was at stake, and there
was no substantial advantage to the community in having them paid a
living wage. Then suddenly light came to one of the members of the
Court and this balance between social advantage and restricted bargain-
ing power was reversed. There were now five justices who believed
that starvation wages for women and children were a sufficient social
menace to warrant a legislative restriction on the free bargaining
power of employers and employees, and as a result minimum wage laws
suddenly became constitutional.
Now in reaching these important decisions the words of the Con-
stitution have played no real part. The Constitution does not mention
minimum wages and it does not explain what it means by due process
of law. The Court therefore must decide whether or not a minimum
wage law is valid without any direct help from the Constitution itself.
The question is in essence not a legal question at all. It is a question
of individual judgment and opinion and the answer which the indi-
vidual judge makes to it will depend upon his social and economic
philosophy, which, in turn, will depend upon his early environment and
education and his business or professional associations. This is what
Mr. Justice Stone was driving at when he said, "It is difficult to
imagine any grounds, other than our own personal economic predilec-
tions" for holding a minimum wage law void. 15 And when the Supreme
Court invalidates important legislation on the basis of its "own eco-
nomic predilections" it is doing the work of a legislature and not of a
court ; it is determining questions of legislative policy and not questions
of law. Minimum wage laws were unconstitutional for fourteen years
not because the Constitution forbids them but because a majority of
the Court believed them unsound and objectionable.
Let us examine next the Schechter case 16 in which the Supreme
Court held void the National Industrial Recovery Act. We may pass
by that part of the Court's decision holding that the N.I.R.A. invalidly
delegated legislative power to the President, because the statute could
easily have been amended to avoid that constitutional defect. The
crucial issue in the case was whether Congress in the exercise of its
delegated power to regulate interstate commerce could validly authorize
lsSee his dissenting opinion in Morehead v. New York ex rcl. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587, 1936. In this case the Court, by a five-to-four decision, held void
the New York Minimum Wage Act.
"Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 1935.
{ 55 }
the application of a code of fair competition to a Brooklyn wholesale
poultry market and punish violations of that code. The Court, in a
unanimous decision, held that it could not. The Government urged that
the transactions in the Schechters' poultry market, and other similar
establishments covered by the code, vitally affected the stream of inter-
state commerce in poultry in the metropolitan area. Congress therefore
could properly take measures to protect that interstate commerce
against the harmful effects of bad labor conditions and unfair competi-
tive practices prevailing in the local markets. In a substantial number
of cases the Court had permitted federal power to penetrate into local
affairs in order to protect interstate commerce from the effects of local
evils or local discrimination. The Supreme Court did not repudiate
these earlier decisions. It did not even deny that conditions prevailing
in the Schechters' poultry market had an influence upon the interstate
commerce which Congress might lawfully regulate. It merely held that
that influence was "indirect" and not "direct" and therefore the code
could not be sustained under the commerce power. Here is an im-
portant act of Congress striken down by the Court because it falls on
the wrong side of the line by which the Court separates those transac-
tions and interests which are "directly" connected with interstate
commerce from those which are only "indirectly" connected with it.
It is perfectly clear that in making such a decision and in drawing
such a line the Court translates into a rule of constitutional law its own
opinions as to how far the policy of federal centralization under the
commerce power should be permitted to go, again a question of policy,
a question of expediency, thinly disguised as a question of law.
There is a third type of decision in which the Court even more
clearly assumes the role of the lawmaker. These are the cases in which
the Court invalidates acts of Congress because delegated powers have
been used for what the Court regards as wrongful purposes. Some of
the best illustrations have arisen under the federal taxing power. In
1902, Congress, under pressure from the powerful lobby representing
the dairy interests of the country, drove colored oleomargarine out of
the market by levying on it a prohibitive tax of ten cents per pound.
Two years later in the McCray case 17 the Supreme Court upheld the
statute against the charge that it was an abuse of the federal taxing
power since its purpose was not revenue but destruction. The Court
refused to inquire into or worry about the motives which had led
Congress to pass the act. Such motives cannot properly be made the
subject of judicial scrutiny. The oleomargarine tax is "on its face" a
revenue measure. It is, in short, "objectively" constitutional, and
whether it is "subjectively" unconstitutional, whether Congress had an
ulterior and unconstitutional purpose in levying it, is none of the
"McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 1904.
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Court's business. A year ago this doctrine was reaffirmed in a case in
which Congress had imposed a special license tax of $200 per year
upon those engaged in selling machine-guns, sawed off shotguns or
rifles, and silencers. "On its face," says Mr. Justice Stone, "it is a
taxing measure" and "inquiry into the hidden motives which may move
Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is
beyond the competency of the Court." 18 The good faith of Congress
is evidenced by the fact that twenty-seven people paid the tax in 1934
and twenty-two in 1935, so it must have been a revenue measure. In
1919, however, Congress imposed a tax of ten per cent upon the net
income of those employing children in violation of the standards set
up in the act. It had also passed the Future Trading Act by which a
tax of twenty cents a bushel was laid upon all grain sold on future
contracts upon grain exchanges which were not registered with the
Secretary of Agriculture and subject to his regulations. The Supreme
Court held both of these statutes unconstitutional. 19 The taxes levied
were not really taxes at all. They were penalties imposed on those who
indulge in practices which Congress objects to but may not directly
forbid. Speaking of the child labor tax Chief Justice Taft declared,
"Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All
others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our
minds to it?" How indeed, except by just following the sound and
wholesome doctrine of the oleomargarine tax case that the motives
leading Congress to exercise a delegated power are not a proper sub-
ject for judicial examination. But this the Court was not willing to do.
Last year the Court applied the rule of the Child Labor Tax Case to
a federal statute imposing an annual license tax of $1000 upon anyone
engaging in the business of selling liquor in violation of the laws of a
state. 20 This, again, is a fiscal penalty and not a tax and encroaches,
therefore, upon state power.
Now the Court in these tax cases has very deftly managed to eat
its cake and keep it too. It invalidated the child labor tax without
overruling its decision in the oleomargarine tax case. It has, therefore,
both rules to play with and can select with a good deal of freedom
which prohibitory or regulatory federal taxes it is going to hold valid
and which it is going to hold void. Looking at them realistically there
is no essential difference in the nature of these taxes or the privileges
or interests upon which they fall. Congress taxes the privilege of
making colored oleomargarine, the privilege of employing children, the
privilege of selling the kinds of weapons with which gangster crimes
are usually committed, or the privilege of operating as a bootlegger
"Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 1937.
"Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20,
1922; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 1922.
20United States v. Constantine, note 11, supra.
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within a state. Congress could not directly forbid an}" one to exercise
any of these privileges on which it has laid its tax. In every case the
tax is for a non-fiscal purpose and everybody knows it. When the
Court approves of the regulatory policy involved in the tax it turns a
blind eye to the obvious effect of the tax and applies the test of
"objective constitutionality." But with equal ease it can invalidate a
similar regulatory tax, by taking into account "what everybody knows"
and applying the test of "subjective constitutionality." In deciding
which formula to use the Court is able to give effect to its own views
as to the expediency of the legislative policy involved, it is able to
exercise a policy-determining power.
I have no patience with the pious verbal expressions and legal
epigrams by which certain judges and lawyers seek to camouflage or to
conceal the essentially legislative power which the Court exercises
in the handling of these three groups of cases and many others. In
applying these vague and general clauses of the Constitution to concrete
cases the Court has the opportunity, and it embraces the opportunity,
of giving effect to its hunches, its predilections, and its prejudices. In
interpreting due process of law it may read into the Constitution either
a progressive social philosophy or a Mid-Victorian theory of "rugged
individualism." In setting the limits to the commerce power it may
swing the balance toward an aggressive federal centralization or
toward an equally vigorous protection of state rights. In my judg-
ment the legislative power which the Supreme Court now wields in the
exercise of its power of judicial review of legislation is far greater
than can be soundly adjusted to the principles of democratic govern-
ment. Our constitutional system rests on the principle that the legisla-
tive power of the United States is vested in the Congress. It is not
vested in the Supreme Court. It seems to me one of the vicious
paradoxes of our national democracy that so many vital questions of
national policy are determined in the last analysis by the "personal
economic predilections" of Supreme Court justices.
III. Can the Supreme Court be divested of its undemocratic
assumption of legislative power?
This brings me to my final and very practical topic—Can the
Supreme Court be divested of its undemocratic assumption of legisla-
tive power? How can we establish a sounder and more democratic
balance between the legislative and judicial powers under the Ameri-
can Constitution? I have two answers to this question, but before ex-
plaining them may I mention some proposals which I do not favor. I
do not believe that the Supreme Court should be deprived of its power
to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. I do not attach much
importance to the suggestions that Congress should so alter the appel-
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late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as to reduce substantially the
number of chances the Court would have to pass on the validity of
laws. I have never been enthusiastic about the proposal to require
seven or more of the nine members of the Supreme Court to concur in
declaring a statute void. Such a rule does not go to the root of the
problem and I doubt if it would accomplish any very important results.
I am not in favor of giving Congress the power to override decisions
of the Supreme Court declaring acts of Congress void, although I
should be glad indeed to see rather similar results attained by making
our clumsy process of federal constitutional amendment simpler and
more democratic. I merely state my views on these points as I do not
have time to explain my reasons for holding them.
The first of my proposals is a very simple and wholly unspectacular
one. It does not upset anything and it would, I believe, increase rather
than weaken the Court's prestige. It is the simple proposal that the
Court shall of its own volition abandon the job of legislating and
confine itself to the task of judging; that in reviewing legislation it
shall accord what Mr. Justice Washington over a hundred years ago
called "a decent respect due to the legislative body by which any law
is passed." 21 This is, of course, exactly what the Supreme Court
officially claims that it does, and no one would endorse my suggestion
more heartily, in all probability, than those justices who have been
among the most ruthless in overriding legislation on the basis of
"personal economic predilections."
But what I have in mind is not a matter of words. It is a thing of
the spirit, a positive and aggressive determination on the part of the
Court to encroach just as little as possible upon legislative discretion,
a complete unwillingness to invalidate a statute if any reasonable
ground can be discovered upon which it may be sustained. This was
the life-long judicial philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes. Justices
Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone now uphold this doctrine of judicial
tolerance. It claims the adherence of Chief Justice Hughes not in-
frequently and of Mr. Justice Roberts once in a while. This attitude is
peculiarly necessary in applying the nebulous test of due process of
law to social and economic legislation. Whether such legislation is
"arbitrary" or not, is, after all, a matter of opinion and the legislature
is entitled to its opinion even if that opinion be mistaken or foolish.
"There is nothing that I more deprecate," said Mr. Justice Holmes,
"than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute com-
pulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that
an important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers
afforded by the several states, even though the experiments may seem
futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most
'Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 213, 1827.
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respect."22 There is a certain irony in the fact that Holmes came to be
universally regarded as a great liberal. Every advocate of social and
economic reform regarded him as an ally. And so he was—but not
always in the sense in which they thought him to be. There is reason
to believe that Holmes had little use for a large amount of the social
and economic reform which he voted to hold constitutional. In his
own social philosophy he was a fairly conservative man. But he be-
lieved firmly two things—first, as he neatly put it, "I am not God"
;
second, an American legislature possesses what Lowell called in the
Bigelow Papers "the right to be a cussed fool," and that right must
be respected and protected by the Supreme Court. Holmes's liberalism
was the liberalism of tolerance, often a disgusted tolerance, a tolerance
grounded on respect for the integrity of the legislature's own job no
matter how stupidly that job was done. That attitude on the part of
the Court is vitally necessary at the present time. Its attainment and
the development of a tradition which would make it permanent would
do more to restore the Supreme Court to its proper place in the Ameri-
can Constitutional system than any of the drastic proposals which I
mentioned and discarded a moment ago.
Is there any hope of securing such an attitude upon the part of the
Court towards legislation? I believe there is even if results of this
somewhat intangible sort may not be achieved all at once. There are
two ways in which progress may be made. One is by the slow
process of education. This means education within the legal profes-
sion so that lawyers who attain seats on the Bench will have a sound
and wise understanding of the nature of the judge's job with respect to
legislation. It means education on a broader base so that there may be
an increasingly well-informed public opinion to insist upon the appoint-
ment to the Bench of men who have this attitude. We are beginning
to profit from the results of this educational movement which has been
going on for twenty years or more. A second way in which progress
may be made is by focusing attention and public pressure upon the
Presidential appointment of judges of the right kind and upon their
confirmation by the Senate. I cannot develop this in detail. Our
existing system of choosing Supreme Court justices does not give us
as good results as it should. We get a few distinguished men, a good
many able men, and now and again somebody definitely below par.
The country is entitled to have on the Bench judicial statesmen. The
traditions surrounding Supreme Court appointments must be so shaped
as to secure them. It must be made good politics for the President to
name such men and for the Senate to confirm them. The making of
these vitally important appointments should never be casually inad-
vertent. It might be wise if the rules of the Senate should forbid the
2Dissenting opinion in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 1921.
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confirmation of major judicial appointments in less than thirty days
so that full and open hearings may be had upon the qualifications of
the men named by the President. Progress along these lines may be
slow and erratic, but I believe that public opinion in this country is
coming to see the importance of securing the right kind of Supreme
Court justices and that we shall build up the kind of traditions which
will insure their appointment.
I have a second proposal to make. This we may fall back on if we
fail to persuade the Supreme Court to abdicate voluntarily its legisla-
tive and policy-determining functions and to adopt the wise tolerance
toward legislative discretion which Mr. Justice Holmes preached and
practiced. This proposal is that we adopt clarifying amendments to
the Constitution which will sharpen the meaning of its clauses, make
clear the scope of its delegations of power, and the impact of its
limitations. The Court in construing the commerce clause of the due
process clause is engaged in making broad decisions of policy which do
not properly belong to a judicial body. We could relieve it of that
power by clarifying those clauses so that their meaning and application
is no longer a matter of honest dispute. If we wish to make sure that
the power of Congress under the commerce clause includes the regula-
tion of laboring conditions under which goods are made for the inter-
state market, then let us say so with definiteness and precision. If we
are tired of having the due process of law clause used by conservative
judges to throttle needed social legislation, let us make clear what we
wish the due process limitation to mean, or discard it altogether. 1
believe that the Court itself would welcome such a change. I believe
we should all be better satisfied if, without impairing the integrity or
the traditions of our judicial system, we left to the Court the task of
applying constitutional clauses which have reasonably definite meaning,
instead of attacking it for giving what we feel is the wrong meaning to
clauses so vague as to have no clear and concrete meaning of their
own. Our whole judicial system would gain in efficiency, and in public
confidence, under such a change.
I have traced the stages through which the Supreme Court has
gradually acquired the vast and far-reaching power over legislation
which it now exercises. I have undertaken to show that this power has
enabled the Court to dominate wide ranges of legislative policy in the
light of the opinions and prejudices of the justices, and I have sug-
gested that this exercise of essentially legislative power by a court of
law conflicts with the democratic principle upon which we have built
our governmental system. I have no patience with the attitude of
constitutional ancestor-worship which rejects as sacrilege any change
in the Constitution or in the Supreme Court's power of judicial review,
but I have no desire to see the power of judicial review pulled up by
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the roots or mutilated. Let the Supreme Court clean its own house.
Let it replace an arrogantly ruthless attitude toward the exercise by
Congress of its legislative discretion, by the tolerant aloofness which
bespeaks the judge and not the lawmaker. Let the President and the
Senate place on the Supreme Court men who appraise correctly the
relation between the Court and Congress. If the Supreme Court
cannot or will not do this let us, instead of changing the Court or
changing its power of judicial review, change the concrete nature of
the job which we give it to do. Let us withdraw from the reach of its
interpretation those vast uncharted ranges of discretion which come
from vague and general clauses of the Constitution. Let us sharpen
and clarify the sections in the construction of which the Court now
finds it possible to impose its policy judgments upon the country. By
following this course we shall preserve and strengthen the best features
of the American system of judicial review of legislation. We shall get
rid of its weaknesses and its dangers. The Supreme Court of the
United States will become not an obstacle but an aid to the smooth
and efficient working of democratic government in a great nation.
{62 }
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